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MAIN TALKING POINTS: NEW MEXICO AND AFRICA 
·~·*Contributing to "opening up" Africa much as Teddy Roosevelt 
had done three fourths of a century earlier in Latin America, 
Reagan's militarization of that continent followed over half a 
century during which US transnational corporations with South 
African links had been shifting investments from New Mexico to 
southern African mines to take advantage of the low wages imposed 
first under colonialism and then apartheid. As a result, New 
Mexico's mine employment had dwindled to a small percentage of 
its labor force, and fell even further in the 1980s as 
transnational mining firms told New Mexican miners 'international 
competition' gave them the choice of accepting lower wages or 
losing their jobs <pp. 2 - 5 and Notes on Structural Issues, 
<attached>. 
**Linked growing militarization of the state's economy, the 
state's development strategy of attracting high tech 
manufacturing plants -- though somewhat successful since New 
Mexican wages are about $4000 below the national average 
benefitted only a relatively few workers, mainly located near 
urban centers <pp. 5; and Notes, attached>. 
**Far from overcoming New Mexico's poverty, the military 
expenditures stimulated by the nation's military build-up 
accompanying increased militarization in Africa has aggravated 
the state's lop-sided development. The military installations 
provide low paid service jobs for nearby resident s , but these do 
not offset hidden costs in terms of increased taxes to pay for 
infrastructure and environmental degradation. Military contracts 
stimulate a few high tech industries and misdirect university 
research to military- related high tech, rather than helping to 
overcome the causes of growing poverty in the state <pp.l2-15>. 
**Increased national military spending has nearly destroyed 
the social welfare safety net that New Mexican and other 
Americans worked to establish over the last half century, leaving 
growing numbers of New Mexicans without basic necessities of life. 
Institutionalized discrimination especially aggravated poverty 
among Mexican Americans and Native Americans, women and old folk 
<pp. 17>. 
**An end to militarization, permitting full liberation and 
development in Africa, along with direction of this nation 's 
resources to meet the needs of the people of New Mexico and the 
US could lead to mutually beneficial trade, full employment and 
rising living on both sides of the Atlantic <p p. 18, and Notes, 
attached>. 
MILITARIZATION IN AFRICA AND ITS IMPACT ON NEW MEXICO 
INTRODUCTION: 
The growing US militarization of Africa 
affects the economic situation confronting the 
populations of the southwest United States in two 
respects: First, given the technological revolution 
that has shrunken the world's parameters, US military 
support for conservative governments seeks to open up 
the rich mineral and agricultural resources and vast 
low paid labor reserves of the African continent 
<three times the size of the United States with a 
population of over 500 illion) to US transnationals, 
putting the wages and working conditions of the US 
Southwest in competition with those of the oppressed 
workers of places like apartheid Sout h Africa; and, 
second, the increased militar izat ion of the US itself, 
including the Southwest, while enriching a few very 
large transnational corporations and counties, imposes 
both direct and hidden costs that undermine the living 
standards of the major i ty of people of the region. 
I. BACKGROUND: To understand the consequences of US 
milit~rization in Africa in the U.S. southwest, it helps, first, 
to outline the historical circumstances that shaped the current 
dichotomous d e velopment of resources in New Mexico: 
A. New Mexico, the focus of the Spanish colonizer's North 
American conquest, has in the last century become a relatively 
less important hinterland of modern Texas: 
1. The Spanish colonialists by-passed Texas to pursue the 
(contradictory) aims of obtaining mineral riches with slave labor 
while converting the relatively populous sedentary peoples 
(especially the Pueblos) who had long before established a 
self-sufficient agricultural and handicraft economy and developed 
mines. 
2. In the mid 19th Century, expanding westwards to fulfill a 
self-proclaimed 'man ifest destiny,· the United States came into 
conflict with and defeated the army of the newly independent 
Mexican government, taking over New Mexico along with western 
lands originally claimed by the Mexicans. 
For almost three fourths of a century, New Mexico 
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remained without statehood, reflecting US suspicions aroused by 
conflicts between the Native American peoples, the Mexican 
Americans, and 'Anglos' trekking in, mainly from Texas and the US 
South, primarily in search of mineral wealth -- bringing with 
them their prejudices. 
a. US army policies of coercing Native American s into 
reserves (an idea later adopted by South Africans in sett ing 
up reserves that became the 'bantustans') refl ected racist 
perspectives; eg. Commander of the California Column 
Carleton, who assumed control of the Department of New Mexico . 
in the 1860s, supported placing Native Americans on 
reservations which 
"vJi 11 be Islands; and as time elapses and the race 
dies out, these Islands may become less and less, until 
finally, the great sea <of white men > will engulf them 
one after another until they become known only in 
history and at length are blotted out, of even that, 
b. After the Ci vi 1 {.lJar, th e "Santa Fe Ring," consisting 
largely of Republican "Anglos" with- ties to Washington, 
dominated New Mexico's economy, engaging in railroads, 
ranching, mining, and above all land grants with 'rubber like 
qualities' as they stretched far beyond their original 
boundaries. 
c. The economy developed rapidly around mines, developed to 
provide raw materials for the rapidly industrializing eastern 
st,::ttes, and "Ang 1 o" sett 1 eJ~s stimulated by speculative 1 and 
companies that accompanied railroad construction and s queezed 
out Mexic an American farmers. 
d. In the 1890s , New Mexican Populists, uniting smaller 
farmers , stock owners and the Knights of Labor (centered 
around mine workers) in oppositon to cattle barons, land 
companies, and alien land ownership, swept through New 
Me:-: i co. 
4. The coming of the railroad s , centered largely in Texas 
l. F. D Reeve, "The Long Walk .1 " NevJ Me>: i co Historical Review, Vol. 
XIII.) no. 1 <Jan 1938), pp. 14-::::;s; republished in R.N. Ellis, 
ed. New Mexico Past a nd Present a historical reader 
<A lbuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971>. 
reduced the im~ortance of the Santa Fe trail westwards~ and 
assured the much larger state of Texas, with its growing oil 
wealth and access to the sea, the dominant place in the region. 
5. Today, New Mexico, with its population of about one and a 
half million divided about evenly between urban and rural areas, 
remains primarily a hinterland of the Texas economy, 
characterized by many similar features, although minerals other 
than oil play a far more significant role. <For more information 
about structural characteristics of the southwest regional 
economy, see attached Notes on Transnational Corporations .... ) 
a. In 1984, mining employment, about 21,000, still 
constituted about 6 percent of the labor force, and annual pay 
averaged $25,759: 
i. Over the last half century or more, US transnational 
mining companies, financed by eastern capital, had 
increased the capital intensity of mines in the US 
southwest, and -- in collaboration with the South 
African-bas ed mining finance house, Anglo America (see 
below), op e ned new mines in lower wages areas in regions 
like southern Africa. 
11. Since 1980, alone, New Mexican mining employment had 
dropped by a fourth, as mining companies like Newmont, 
AMAX, and Phelps Dodge Call with mine interests in South 
Africa) --· ir·on ically citing "inter-national competition" ---
pressed the workers to accept wage cuts or lose their jobs. 
iii. New Mexican uranium mines, many of them owned by oil 
companies aQd mining firms with assets in South Africa 
(including Standard Oil of California, Newmont Mining, 
Union Carbide and Phelps Dodge; see below) closed[For 
list of uranium mills and ownership, as well as 
environmental controls in New Mexico, see Southwest 
Research and Information Center, The Workbook, July/Sept, 
1985. J; 
with growing pressure for improved environmental 
controls, and increased imports of uranium from South 
Africa (including those produced in violation of UN 
sanctions in Namibia) the companies closed down their New 
Mexican facilities. 
b. Less than 2% of New Mexico's population, about 20,000 
families, still lived on farms. As throughout the nation, the 
farm crisis, caused by rising farming costs and low prices, 
had pushed family farmers out of business, reducing the farm 
population by more than half from 1970 level of 45,000 
families (4.42% of the populalion). 
c. In 1982, about 33,000 workers (two thirds of them 
- f.l. ·-
production workers) held jobs in manufacturing industries, 
about 15% of the labor force (a slightly lower proportion than 
in Teqas). 
i. From 1980 to 84, manufacturing employment rose about 
6.4% (in contrast to a decline in Texas), perhaps because 
production workers' wage averaged $17,188, over $4000 
below the average in Texas and the nation. 
11. A high proportion of the jobs were in electric and 
electronic equipment, apparently the production work 
for which high tech firms, like those with headquarters in 
Texas high tech urban centers, conducted the R & D. 
d. Over two thirds of New Mexico's labor force works in 
non-productive activities, reflecting the growth of the 
tourist industry, finance and trade. As in Texas and the 
nation, however, wages in these sectors remain well below 
those in mining and manufacturing. 
i. New Mexico ' s banking community has grown increasingly 
dominated by Western Bancorporation, the lOth largest 
banking holding company in the country, which controls the 
Bank of New Mexico, First State Bank at Gallup, New Mexico 
Bank and Trust, Roswqell State Bank, and Santa Fe National 
Bank. 
ii. Western Bancorporation has direct interlocks with 
Caltex Petroleum and Standard Oil of California, and 
indirect interlocks with Citicorp (6), Standard Oil of 
California (4) and Atlantic Richfield (3), all of which 
own assets in South Africa. [For details, see Tom 
Berry, New Mexico's Financial Institutions: an 
Investigation, <Research Center, P.O. Box 4726, 
Albuquerque NM 87196).] 
iii. The extent to which Westernbancorp may have loaned 
funds deposited in New Mexico to firms shifting productive 
activities or trading with places like South Africa needs 
investigation. 
~li IIi ng 
Manufacturing 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 
Finance, etc. 
Services 
Employment 
<1985 in $000) 
21 
33 
21 
94 
24 
103 
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Wages <1983 annual average) 
NM TX US 
$25,759 $30,698 $28,808 
$17,188 $21 ,584 $21 ,469 
$18,079 $23,951 $21 ,507 
$9,433 $10,990 $10,007 
$15,364 $20,039 $19,579 
$15,102 $15,859 $15,351 
II. THE CASE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA illustrates the reasons for and 
the impact of US militarization in Africa? with its implications 
for development in the US southwest~ 
A. The post World War II technological revolution 
facilitated the growth of US transnational corporate investme nt 
in Africa, first to gain access to rich mineral and agricultural 
resources, using the cheap labor reserves (even lower than those 
of Latin America because of the disruption caused by centuries of 
the slave trade, followed by a hundred years of outright colonial 
rule); and then to build manufacturing industries, especially in 
South Africa where apartheid ensured continued low cost labor 
along with access to southern African raw materials, markets fo r 
manufactured goods? and high rates of profit. 
<This background is detailed in Seidman, The Roots of Crisi s 
in Southern Africa <Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985> and 
Seidman, Apartheid and the U.S. Southeast, forthcoming, esp. 
Chs. 3 and 4) 
1. US mining and financial interests have long invested in 
southern African minerals, gradually shifting to sources there 
while reducing mining output and laying off US miners: 
a. South Africa's leading mining finance house, the 
Anglo American Group, began operations at the outset of World 
War I with the help of Morgan financial interests; and has 
since e xpanded its ties in the US through a growing network of 
corporate interests, including Engelhard <which provided it 
with Democratic Party links); Newmont Mining <whi ch today owns 
Peabody, a leading US coal mining company, in partnership with 
Bechtel, which contributed Shultz and Weinburger to Reagan's 
Cabinet>; and American Metal Climax <AMAX> --all of which 
have mining interests in the US southwest (see list of 
Anglo-American international affiliations in Innes, Anglo 
America and the Rise of Modern South Africa). In the 1970s, 
the Anglo American Group, operating through its offshore 
Bermuda base, MINORCO, became the second largest foreign 
investor in the United States, with controlling investments in 
a wide range of activities, beginning in mines and extending 
into finance, including the leading Wall Street firm, Phibro 
Salomon, with links to the Rockefeller Citicorp. 
b. Starting after the first World War and continuing 
through the apartheid era into the present, in collaboration 
with US and British firms, the Anglo Group developed mines 
throughout South and southern Africa, including copper in 
Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zaire (where it also 
worked with Belgian interests>; diamonds in Botswana, Namibia, 
Angola, and Tanzania; iron ore in Swaziland and , in 
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cooperation with the then -Rhodesian government, Zi mbabwe; 
platinum and gold in South Africa; and uranium in South Africa 
and Namibia (in cooperation with Rio Tinto Zinc). Union 
Carbide developed chrome and ferro chrome mines in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. As the US companies shifted to southern and 
particularly South Africa for their sources of these minerals, 
they strengthened the basis of the argument that these 
provided "strategic" interests which US policy must protect. 
i. Companies like AMAX and Newmont could close down the 
southwestern mines and import copper and other s trategic 
minerals, including lead, platinum and vanadium (see 
Appendix I in Roots of Crisi s ) from their southern African 
mines where they paid workers a fraction of what they paid 
unionized US mine workers. 
ii. In the late 1970s and '80s, world copper prices 
plumme ted. The independent African copper producers 
Zambia, Zaire and Zimbabwe -- having adopted western advice 
to expand copper instead of redirecting their copper 
profits to more balanced integrated economic development, 
experienced growing foreign debts. The IMF imposed 
conditions forcing them to devalue their currencies, 
further lowering their workers' real wages to cut their 
copper prices, in a desparate effort to expand their copper 
sales. 
iii. When Rio Tinto Zinc began to sell Namibian uranium, 
mined under conditions of apartheid <with little or no 
protection against the effects of radiation) by workers 
receiving wages less than a fourth those of US miners (in 
violation of UN embargo against investment s in Namibia 
until South Africa granted it independence) US mine firms 
stopped mining uranium in New Mexico and laid off thousands 
of wo,~kers. 
2. The ,~ole of the US "majors" in African oi 1: 
a. As African states won political independence and improved 
communications and shipping facilities reduced the costs of 
long - distance production in the post World War II era, US oil 
"major·s" e:·:panded their e:-:ploration and e:-:ploitation of 
African crude oil in Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Angola, 
shipping it to their refineries at home or elsewhere for sale 
throughout the world's market s. 
i. Initially, the US oil companies shipped away the 
African states' low cost crude, paying little in taxes, and 
remitting most of their profits without regard for national 
development . With the advent of OPEC, the participating 
African states forced up world oil prices and captured a 
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larger share of the resulting investable surpluses, but, 
through their control of the major refineries and marketing 
networks, the companies reaped even higher profits 
attaining the status of the world's largest companies with 
incomes exceeding that of several independent African 
countries. 
ii. Some African countries sought to reinvest their oil 
profits in their national development, achieving some 
success in restructuring their economies to meet their 
peoples' needs. 
iii. The non-oil producing countries, their modern 
export-orientedebckaves dependent on oil for fuel and 
lubrication, had to spend up to a third of their export 
earnings to buy oil, regardless of the price-- a 
significant factor in their mounting external debt. 
iv. In southern Africa, Angola, upon attain liberation 
from the Portuguese in 1976, negotiated an agreement with 
Gulf Oil (now Chevron) to acquire shares in Gulf's Angolan 
affiliate, and half the profits. In return for its shares, 
Gulf would train local people, provide the necessary 
technology, and refine and sell the oil through its 
international marketing network. 
a) Through Gulf, the US remained Angola's leading 
trading partner. 
b) A member of the nine- state association of 
independent southern African countries <the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference, SADCC> 
that sought to cooperate to attain development and 
reduce dependence on South Africa, Angola agreed, once 
it established its own refinery capacity and developed 
the essential infrastructure, to provide lower-cost oil 
products to its fellow SADCC members 
b. The 'majors' made their biggest oil refinery investments 
on the entire African continent, not in the independent 
states, but in South Africa . There they made a key 
contribution to building up the racist minority's 
military-industrial capacity to oppress the African majority 
at home and destabilize the entire southern African region. 
i. Ironically, South Africa has no oil deposits of its 
own; but it depends on the oil 'majors' - - Caltex <Standard 
Oil of California and Texaco>, Mobil, and Shell-BP --to bring 
in oil for their refineries. This they did, under a heavy 
curtain of government secrecy, despite the OPEC and UN 
attempts to impose an effective boycott. <Mobil earlier 
helped to evade the UN boycott against the then-Rhodesian 
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government which had unilaterally declared independence <UDI> 
to prevent establishment of majority rule in what, after 15 
years of guerilla war, became Zimbabwe.) 
ii. Shell-BP collaborated with the South African 
government-owned Sentrachem to build a petrochemicals 
industry, essential for inputs to industry and its 
growing military buildup. 
iii. The US engineering firm, Fluor, constructed a giant 
oil-from-coal facility for the minority government's 
SABOL, designed to reduce its dependence on imported oil 
(its capacity remains secret, but estimates range from 
10% to 30% of South Africa's oil needs. 
(For details re Fluor and Shell-BP's anti-union 
activities in South Africa and the US Southeast, see 
Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 6) 
3. Manufactur ing: 
a. All the independent African states sought to attract 
investment in industries to increase productive employment 
opportunities and raise living standards; but three fourths 
of all U.S. manufacturing investment on the entire continent 
went into the military-industrial manufacturing business of 
apartheid South Africa. Essentially, US firms began to 
extend the maquiladora concept to South Africa where, until 
the 1980s, the regime pursued policies that ensured them 
rates of profit averaging 25 percent. Increasingly, as 
anti-apartheid divestment pressures mounted, US firms shed 
their ownership of local plants and contracted with 
locally-based firms (which they "sold" to the local managers 
or to the Anglo American Group> to sell them the machinery, 
equipment and materials, if necessary helping to finance it. 
They sought thus to continue to take advantage of~ 
<For details re firms and their role in southern Africa, 
see Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 4) 
i. Cheap labor disciplined under apartheid conditions 
for labor intensive manufacturing processes like those of 
auto firms like GM, Ford and Chrysler <the latter two 
sold out to the Anglo American Group>; or textiles <In 
the 1980s, for example, Sears Roebuck could buy textiles 
from Taiwanese firms hiring workers in the bantustans for 
$7 a week, compared eg to North Carolina workers -- the 
lowest paid in the US -- who received $7 an hour; while 
North Carolina lost 43 textile jobs a day, Sears could 
sell "Taiwanese-made " goods despite the unenforced US 
sanctions.> 
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ii. Access to South and southern African crude materials, 
produced by low paid labor i n mines and on corporate and 
settler farms throughout the region and shipped in via 
trading networks dominated by the Anglo American Group. 
iiL Access to markets, including: 
*The wealthy white 20% of the South African 
populat ion who could afford luxury durable goods; 
*Advanced electrical~ automotive, and even 
nuclear-related technologies for the regime 's military, 
expanding as it sought to perpetuate its oppressive 
rule at home and destabilize the region <sales through 
local South African-owned fir ms enabled the US 
manufacturers to evade the letter of the US sanctions 
la~<-J>; GE, General Motors, Westinghouse, IT8~.T 
contributed these kinds of goods; 
*Improved technologies to enable the minority to 
develop industry, mining, agriculture and the military 
~<-Jhile reducing "dependence" on black labor-- a major 
factor contributing to growing unemployment in South 
Africa; firms like IBM, Burroughs, Honeywel l helped 
make whi te South Africa one of the most -- if not the 
most -- highly computerized populations in the world, 
while black unemployment soared to an estimated 30 to 
40 percent of the populations as almost ha lf the black 
population was forced to struggle for survival on the 
destitute bantustans, the least fertil e~ least well 
watered 13 percent of the nation's land. 
*The neighboring countries whose externally oriented 
economies remained dependent on imported machinery, 
equipment~ and luxuries for the elites, now produced in 
South Africa -- as long as South Africa by exerting its 
economic, political and military power to coerce them 
to buy from it. 
4. U.S. banks gave leadership in financing South Africa's 
military industrial buildup: 
a. After the liberation of Mozambique and Angola and the 
Soweto uprising of 1976 in South Africa, US transnation a ls 
invested less directly in South African mines and 
factories; instead they relied on their control of 
technology, finance, and marketing to continue profiting 
from low cost South African labor and resources. 
·-- 1 0 ,,_ 
b. The largest US banks, led by Citicopr -- with its 
close links to US oil majors and mining firms -- mobilized 
US savings through its domestic banking networks to lend 
to South Africa to finance its continued 
military- industrial build - up. 
i. Citicorp alone loaned almost twice as much as th 
next largest U.S. lender. 
(ii. See Section I, above, for Citicorp's indirect 
links to Westernbancorp and New Mexico ' s banks.) 
c. The 1986 US compromise Congresssional sanction s 
(passed over Reagan ' s veto) prohibited further direct 
loans to South Africa, but did not prohibit trade finance 
i. In 1987? Citicorp s old it s South African assets to 
the Anglo American Group, wh i ch combined them with 
Barclays Bank's South African asset s to set up the 
First Nat i onal Bank of South Africa (with about 40% of 
South Africa's bank assets). 
11. US banker s , including Citi c orp, continued to 
finance the sale of goods by and to South Africa, with 
little monitoring by the Reagan admini s tration as to 
whether these violated US sanctions. 
iii. Led by Cit icorp, US and European bankers agreed 
to reschedule South Africa's private foreign debt--
about $14 billion -- on very favorable terms; th is g a ve 
it t i me to try t o overcome the economic crisis caused 
by growing demand s for majority rule. 
B. Increasingly backed by military intervention, the Reagan 
Administration's Constructive Engagement Poli c y in s outhern 
Africa aimed to sustain the conditions in which US "interes ts" 
could thus expand: 
1. It incorporates a two-stranded policy: (for detai 1 s, see 
Seidman, Roots of Cr isi s in Southern Afr ica , especially chs. 5 
and 6. ) : 
a. lt seeks to encourag e the South African regime to 
compromise with its domestic opponents to implement 'reforms ' 
to eliminate the most blatent racist features while 
maintaining the profitable economic status quo; 
b. It aims to slow down change in the neighboring countries 
to give the South African regime time to achieve this goal, 
while retai ning it s domin a nt positio~ throughout the region. 
- 1.1. -· 
2. In implementing this policy, the Reagan administration (for 
details, see Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 4): 
a. Refuses to effectively implement even the 1986 
Congressional compromise sanctions against South Africa 
passed over the President's veto-- or even the UN embargo on 
mi li tary-related equipment (signed by the US>; thus US firms 
may, under the flimsiest pretexts, assist South Africa to 
evade those national and international laws; 
b. Thwarts negotiations for Namib i an independence by 
insisting on linking them with the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola; 
c. Provides open support for the South African supported 
anti-government contra force, UNITA, in Angola, some of it 
through South Africa in violation of the UN emb argo; 
d. Built up a military airforce base in Zaire as a second 
channel of aid for UNITA; 
e. Provides military assistance for the Ki ngdom of Morocco, 
(much of which it uses in its war against the Saharan Peoples 
Repubi ic) , while Morocco provides headquarters for UNITA. 
2. The South African-US supported UNITA focusses on targets that 
aim to disrupt Angola's development and the landlocked 
independent southern African states' efforts to reduce their 
historically-shaped dependence on South Africa: 
a. Seeking to delitimize and destabilize the Angolan 
government, UNITA attacks peasant food production and 
development projects, 
b. To thwart the efforts of Angola 's SADCC neighbor s to use 
them to import and export goods outside of South Africa, 
UNITA destroys Angolan transport networks, especially the 
Benguela Railroad, 
III. The US domestic military buildup, necessary to sustain 
this kind of military intervention designed to 'open up Africa, 
has direct and hidden costs for the US Southwest: 
A. The military spending in the region tend to be concentrated 
among a few firms and in a few areas, thus aggravating the 
lop-sided pattern of state development which enriches a few and 
impoverishes growing numbers of state citizens [For the 
information included in this section, see Reaganomics, the 
Military and New Mexico <New Mexico Peace Conversion Project, 106 
Girard SE, Rm 121C, Albuquerque, NM 87108; phone: 505-268-9557): 
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1. In World War II, the US expanded the military establishment 
in New Mexico, centered around the airforce and nuclear weapons 
development: 
a. Military installations and scientific laboratories 
include (1986: budget and employment): 
*The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories -- birthplace of 
Star Wars ($19m, 10,000 employees); 
*Kirtland air Force Base - storage place for 400 nuclear 
warheads, with thousands of times the capacity of the 
bomb that smashed Hiroshima ($880.7, 10,428 employees; 
*The Cannon Air Force Base ($87 m, 4,432 employees); 
*Sandia Laboratories, started on Kirtland Air Force 
Base, but run since 1949 by Western Electric, an AT&T 
subsidiary C$772 m, 7,245 employees>; 
*White Sands Missile Range ($293.1 m, 8,953 employees>; 
*Holloman Air Force Base ($121.3 m, 9,198 employees); 
*Civilian Engineering Research Facility, operated by 
University of New Mexico; 
*Terminal Effects Research and Analysis 
Group (originated at UNM, moved to Socorro in 1949>; 
*Manzano Base for storing nuclear weapons; 
*Melrose and McGregor Bombing Ranges. 
*Military arm of Department of Energy constructed Waste 
Isolation Pilot Project to dump nuclear waste see 
below re "environmental" pl~oblems<~t.:75.9m., 700 employees) 
b. Aside from the military personnel living on bases, who 
come from all over the nation, the bases primarily provide 
relatively low paid service jobs for Texas citizens living 
in the immediate neighborhood. 
c. Hidden costs of these military activities include: 
i. the loss of tax dollars for military properties, 
since the land is usually exempt from most or all tax 
payments; 
11. tax expenditures for schools, roads, additional 
health facilities and police protection for military 
pel~sonnel; and 
iii. environmental degradation, as weapons production 
and use - - especially nuclear weapons -- impact 
negatively on the air, soil, and groundwater with 
unmeasured consequences for the health of humans: 
a) Josph Salgado, Under Secretary of energy told a 
Congressional panel that $100 billion in cleanup 
costs for all Federal facilities "is pi~obably in the 
- 13 -
ball park." (Nei-'J York times, 3/12/88, p. 10) 
b) The Department of enl~l~gy sal. d it wi J. l "shai'"Pl y 
scale back" the amount of r-adioactivity wast it plans 
to bury in the salt beds 26 miles east of Carlsbad, 
NM, because of water leaks; University of New Mexico 
scientists point out water could rust steel tanks 
containing wastes, leaking them into water table and 
sLU~rounding soils. <New York Times, 3/11/88) 
iv. Other dangers include those from firing missiles; 
some 32 misfires have occurred since World War II as 
missiles targeted at White Sands but fired from Fort Bliss, 
Texas, Green River, Utah, and Fort Wingate, NM, have 
uzcJomed ove1~ Albuquerque, blasted holes in highi-'Jays and 
scattered rasdioactive debris in Mexico.'' <D.H. Morrissey, 
in Albuquerque Journal, 3/28/86>; misfirings included: 
a) March 21, 1985: White Sands Vandal missile was 
destroyed in flight, scattering debris -- including a 
400 pound piece - - on and around US route 70 <closed 
for the test); 
b) July 11, 1970, an Athena missile (carrying 
radioactive Cobalt-57) fired at White 
Sands from Green River overshot its target, land i ng in 
Mexico,lgouging a radioactive trench 20 feet long, 17 
feet wide and 10 feet deep. Army auhtorities "sc:opped 
the contaminated sil, sending it to White Sands for 
burial." 
c) The Army has not released all the facts about the 
mi s-,fi l'·i ngs on grounds of "national security." 
(Morrissey in the Journal, 3/24/86) 
<For other illustrations of these costs from the US southeast, 
see Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 10) 
2. Military contractors in New Mexico: 
a. With only $585 million worth of military contracts, New 
Mexico does not loom large in the nation 's defense business. 
In 1986, the leading contractors included Dynalectrum ($20 
m.), New Mexico State University ($15m.), and the BDM 
corporation ($12m). 
tl. See Seidman, Apartheid and the U.S. Southeast, Chapter 
10, for examples of the potential consequences of military 
contracts in contributing to increased capital intensive 
production, reducing employment; and anti-union policies. 
B. Insofar as militc:\rization supports "maquiladorization" in 
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places southern Africa, facilitating the role of US transnational 
corporations in shifting productive activities from the US to 
that region to exploit the low living standards imposed by the 
dominant South African regime, it has direct implications for 
development in the US southwest~ 
1. As illustrated in New Mexico, it tends to undermine US 
wages and working conditions, contributing to rising 
unemployment in the higher paid productive sectors, with a 
shift to employment opportunities in the lower paid services 
and trade s ectors, leading to declining real incomes for the 
1 owe1'" income sectors of the popul aU. on; <this trend wi 11 
become more evident as devaluation of the US currency reduces 
the global purchasing power of the wages US workers earn), 
a. Growing unemployment: 
i. In 1988, Sen. Jeff Bingaman reported, "Ne11-J Me:-:ico ' s 
unemployment rate hovered over 2 percentage points above 
the national level, even though unemployment in 
Albuquerque and Santa Fe is is below the national 
level. More commonly, the unemplyment rate in the state 
is between 9 and 16 percent with some counties running as 
high as 22 to 27 percent." <Reports, Jan 1988) 
ii. All but four of the pueblos and Native American 
reservations experienced unemployment rates well above 
the average, with most of them exceeding 12% and one, 
Ramah, reaching 36%).2. 
b. Anti-union pressures: 
i. Companies with assets in South Africa, like Phelps 
Dodge, led in developing anti-union pressures; Phelps 
Dodge acquired control of Kennecott's China Mine, and 
insisted on lowering the wages; when the union s truck, it 
brought in strikebreakers and broke the union. 
ii. Union organization declined in New Mexico from 17% 
of the wag e labor force in 1975 to 12.8% in 
1982.3 
2. Anne Seagrave Fullerton, 1986 Poverty in New Mexico 
Mexi co Conference of Churches, revised, 1987) 
3. Troy and Sheflin, Union Source Book, op. cit. 
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C. These factors, combined, have contributed to growing 
impoverishment in New Mexico: l. Senator Jeff Bingaman 
points out "New l"le:·:ico's low aver·age income is caused by 
higher than average unemployment and l OI<'Jer than average wages" 
(His:. "Reports", Washington, DC, Jan 1988) 1. New Me:dco's 
per capita income remains well below the national average 
(1984: NM=$10,262; US=12,789); but even then its income is 
significantly skewed~ 
a. In 1979, a third more than the national average of 
New Mexico's population (17.6%) received less than the 
poverty-level incomes; and with the layoff of miners and 
loss of farms, poverty has spread since then. 
b. A Study by the New Mexico Conference of Churches, 
1986 Poverty in New Mexico, shows a higher-than-average 
proportion of the population in 20 counties receives 
below-poverty-line incomes, 5 of them - - McKinley, Mora, 
Cibola, Socorrow and Guadalupe -- experiencing extreme 
poverty. 
i. The poverty population in rural areas, where 
slightly more than half the people live, is 
significantly higher <20.4%) than in the urban areas 
(14.4%); 
ii. A higher proportion of Hispanics C22.3%)d 
receives below poverty-line-incomes; counties with 
extreme poverty among Hispanics included Torrance, 
Taos, Lincoln, Donna Ana, Guadeloupe, Mora, Chaves, 
Luna, San miguel, De Baca and Roosevelt. In urban 
areas, Las Cruces, where over half the population is 
Hispanic, has the largest below-poverty-line 
proportion of the population, 22.7%; but the largest 
number of urban impoverished people <54,000) live in 
Bernalillo in the Albuquerque area (36.8% Hispanic). 
111. Over a fourth of the Native Americans live below 
the poverty line. Including those on the 
reservations, poverty engulfs 40.2% of all Native 
Americans. In eight reservations the poverty rate is 
over 50%. 
iv. About a fourth of the small black population 
<1.84% of the state's citizens) lives in poverty. 
111. Among all children (0-18 years old), 22.1% live 
in the poverty population, with extreme poverty among 
children in McKinley, Guadaloupe, Roosevelt, Mora and 
San Miguel counties. 
iv. Among the elderly (65+), 19.5% live on 
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below-poverty-line incomes, with even higher 
proportions in 22 counties. Counties where the 
elderly poor reach the highest rates, in some cases as 
much as 45 percent of the elderly population, include 
Mora, Taos, Rio Arriba, McKinley, and Guadeloupe. 
D. To cut taxes and pay for the growing military budget <which 
despite Reagan's promises have created a federal deficit equal to 
the entire growth in the nation's national product since 1980), 
the federal government has reduced domestic spending for basic 
human needs, furthern aggravating the negative effects of the 
changing international division of labor implemented by US 
transnational corporations: 
1. Between 1981 and 1984, New Mexico lost $528 million in 
selected federal progams serving low income populations: 
a. This equals $389 per person in the state, or $2247 per 
person with incomes below the poverty level. 
b. Broken down by program the dollar loss per low income 
person in the state averaged: 
*AFDC & Child support enforcement, -$90.05; 
*Community services, -$36.23; 
*Social services, -$18.75; 
*Child welfare services, -$1.61; 
*Special program for the aging, -$5.65; 
*Developmental disabilities, -$0.80; 
*Subsidized housing, -$51.00; 
*Food stamps, -$91.74; 
*Child nutrition, -$37.73; 
*Elderly nutrition, -$1.73; 
*Special milk, -$7.50; 
*Preventive health care, -$9.00; 
*Health services (material and child) & community health 
centers, -$25.21; 
*Medicaid, -$115.16; medicare, -$226.64; 
*Employment for older Americans, -$1.32; 
*Job training, -$623.16; 
*Assistance for educationally deprived children 
-$133.32.4 
4. Calculated from American Federation of State, County & 
Municipal Employees, The States, The People, and the Reagan 
Years: An analysis of social spending cuts, April, 1984 prepared 
by Fiscal Planning Services, Inc., Washington, DC; note that the 
calculations represent a hypothetical average loss per poor 
person in the state. 
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IV. A peaceful alternative to the present policy of militarization 
and intervention in support of the status quo to further ''open 
Africa up'' to US transnational corporate involvement could 
provide far greater benefits to both the peoples of Africa and 
the United States: 
A. The billions spent in building up US military capacity to 
police the world could be re-directed to providing productive 
employment opportunities, job training, better incomes, and a n 
improved social security safety net for US citizens, including 
those living in the Southwest. 
1. What New Mexicans lose because of military spending: 
*1 A- 6 Introducer Aircraft costs $9 million; that could 
provide jobs for 100,000 youths; 
*l F- 14 Jet Fighter costs $15.6 million, which could 
build 500 low cost 2 bedroom homes; 
*l C_5A Cargo Plane costs $60 million which could feed 
12,000 families of four for a year; 
*the Cruise Missile Program costs $11 billion which could 
finance restoration of the national annual rate of 
inves tment in public works to the 1965 level. 
Source: Gilda Haas, Plant Closures - Myths, Realities 
and Responses, (Boston: South End Press, 1985) 
2. Redirection of the funds currently spent for military and 
military reglated production could provide f ull employment, 
rising incomes, and improved nutrition, housing and health 
for all Americans, including the New Mexi cans now living 
below poverty levels. 
B. An end to support for repressive governments like those 
in South Africa, Zaire and Morocco, coupled with support for the 
full liberation and development of Southern Africa (and, for that 
matter, Africa) could open new opportunities for beneficial trade 
based on expanded purchases of US machinery and equipment to meet 
African development needs in the context of mutua l ly beneficial 
trade. 
1. The liberat ion of South Africa would accelerate development 
in southern Africa by: 
a. Releasing resources now spent on military (about $8 
billion in SA a year, plus 25-50% of budgets of neighboring 
countries) for development projects. 
b. Establishment of a minimum wage floor for southern 
Africans woud augment the regi onal market for expanded 
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output~ stimulating increased investments and output. 
c. SADCC naions, together with a liberated South Africa, 
could plan baanced agricultural and industrial development 
growth;, in half a century reaching levels of deve lop ment 
comparab l e to more i ndustriali zed nations. 
2. Development of southern Africa a long these lines would open 
up possibilities of mutually beneficial trade that would 
stimulate creation of jobs and rising incomes on both sides of 
the Atlantic: 
a. The US currently sel l s 8-10 times as many goods t the 
developed nation s of the world as it does to southern 
Africa; 
b. A developing southern Africa -- a land area the size of 
continental US with about 100 million inhabitants -- could 
provide a rapidly growing market for the machinery and 
equipment which U.S. workers manufacture. 
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Atomic Ar~s-Making -Done ·~ Natiollwide~, -
·Weapons Designing Done at Los Alamos, Sandia, Jivennore Labs ,;-
Los Alamos, ·Sandia and Lawrence Livermore il Pinellas Plant, St Petersb,urg, F1a. · The 1,800 • Pantex Plant, northeast of Amarillo, Texas. Built ·· 
design . America's nuclear weapons. According to employees make neutron generating devices, neutron . in World War II as a high-explosives factory, Pantex 
, government and ot~r sources, once sketches come . detectors and product testers, for nuclear weapons. was converted in 1956 to produce nuclear weai)On:s.' . 
off the drawing boards they go to: ~ Tennessee Y -12 plant; . Oak Ridge. Part of the The 2,500 · employees . now operate America's only · . 11 
• Savannah River Plant, Aiken, S.C. Primary source ~nginal World. War II Manhattan Project, Oak Ridge final assembly point for nuclear weapons. They alSQ ,' 
of plutonium and tritiuJD. Tritium is used in hydrogen . ~s ~~Y. partially under Albuquerque Operations develop TNT-type cheiDical explosives used in nucle- · 
bombs. Plutonium is . used in hydrogen and atomic · JUnsdJction. It employs about 6,100 people in the ar weapons, suppc>rt other . DOE J.ilbs and work on 
bombs. Weapons work employs about 400 people at fabrication and assembly of uranium . and lithium nuclear weapons ~ssembly, . disassembly, testing, 
the plant. parts for nuclear weapons. · quality assurance, repair, ,retirement and· disposal.· . 
• Kansas City Plant, ·Missouri. Manufactures . The U.S . .no longer manufactures weapons-grade Old weapons are disassembled at Pantex. 
electrical and mecluinical components for nuclear uranium, using instead highly enriched U-235 from • Tonapah Test Range;. in Nevada. Albuquerque's . 
weapons, including casings, electronic guidance sys. old. weapons, or U-235 from the national stockpile. Sandia labs have operated the Tonapah Range since · · 
tems, locking devices and mechanical parts. The Some recycling occurs at the Y-12 plant. it was established in 1957. · · · 
plant occupies 2.5 million square feet of floor space • Rocky F1ats Plant, south of Boulder, Colo. Makes Nuclear warheads are · tested at five sites · . 
~ and employs about 7,700 people. · ·plutonium triggers to ignite thermonuclear weapons. worldwide. All U.s; and British warheads are deton- . 
. • Mound Plant, Miamisburg, Ohio. The staff of 2,300 . At the 6,505-acre facility, 5,500 employees illso ated at Tonapah. As of Jan. 1, the U.S. bad exploded· 
conducts research and manufactures detonators, ·reprocess and reclaim plutonium from dismantled 772 nuclear weapons ~· most at Tonapab. The Soyi.et 
· timers and small explosive components for weapons. weapons. · Union bad exploded 564:nuclear weapons . 
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